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Past problems with the Department of Defense anthrax vaccine currently impact 
national emergency response plans approved by the Department of Homeland Security 
and Department of Health and Human Services. Following the 2001 anthrax letter 
attacks, those departments diverged from long established protocols advocating limited 
use of the old anthrax vaccine, also known as BioThrax®. The Executive departments 
procured mass quantities of the product for the Strategic National Stockpile as a 
prophylaxis for citizens under emergency contingencies. The departments share 
oversight responsibilities for the emergency stockpile’s composition of vaccines and 
drugs based on Presidential Directives.1 Yet a review of past oversight efforts reveals 
regulatory problems, ethical controversies and dubious threat assessments underlying 
use of the vaccine. Based on the historic controversy, and studies suggesting the 
majority of U.S. service members continue to object to the vaccine’s use,2 the 
government should resurvey the vaccine’s suitability for American citizens. A thorough 
review may find that widespread use of a known antiquated product of disputed safety 
and efficacy in treating a non-communicable threat provides an imprudent illusion of 
protection for our citizens. 
This article explores the Department of Defense’s experience with the anthrax 
vaccine, and the troubling possibility that the 2001 anthrax letter attacks were a 
deliberate and successful effort to sustain a program that federal investigators 
determined was on the verge of failing. Reflection on why the mandatory military 
program escaped review following the federal investigation warrants deliberation. 
Enumerating the safety, efficacy, regulatory and legal problems encountered by the 
military program provides a prism to analyze future hurdles in using the vaccine on 
civilians. Finally, comparing past problems with current threat assessments offers an 
opportunity to suggest potential alternative countermeasures which minimize the 
negative externalities resulting from the old anthrax vaccine. 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANTHRAX VACCINE EXPERIENCE 
Doctrinal debate over the current anthrax vaccine’s role in biodefense precipitated 
initiation of the Defense Department’s mandatory anthrax vaccine immunization 
program.3 A Washington Post article captured the controversy, stating that “Military 
leaders were initially doubtful about the need for the anthrax vaccine.” The exposé 
revealed an inverted policy process – “starting at the top instead of trying to staff an 
issue from the bottom up” – adding to the program’s problematic origins.4 
The only previous mass use of the 1950s-era vaccine occurred in the 1990s, when over 
150,000 soldiers received inoculations during the first Gulf War, with many later 
reporting illnesses of unknown origins.5 A decade later, the George W. Bush 
administration recognized the problems associated with the anthrax vaccine and Gulf 
War Syndrome. Officials directed a review of the program early in 2001. A memo from 
Presidential Advisor Karl Rove to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz6 resulted 
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in recommendations from Defense Undersecretaries Dr. David Chu and Edward 
Aldridge to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.7 The defense officials advocated 
halting the mass mandatory program and continuing use of the vaccine only at a 
“minimum level.” They recommended purchasing biological detection devices and 
antibiotics to protect the soldiers “in the absence of an anthrax vaccine.”  
The undersecretaries suggested a comprehensive review of doctrinal positions and 
development of a “coherent institutional process” for future prioritization of threats and 
assessments of countermeasures. The leaders also echoed a longstanding call for 
development of a “national long-range vaccine.” The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff subsequently challenged these recommendations, insisting the vaccine was “the 
centerpiece of our defense against the most likely biological threat agent.”8 Newspaper 
articles captured the debate over use of the vaccine,9 and recent Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and Department of Justice revelations reignited the controversy. The 
Justice Department alleged the anthrax vaccine program’s “failing” status served as the 
stated motive in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. By sending anthrax through the U.S. 
mail system, the perpetrator was attempting to create a situation where the government 
might recognize a renewed need for the vaccine.10 
The government’s subsequent decision to continue to procure the vaccine after the 
letter attacks appears to discount the prior problems encountered by the U.S. military. 
The Department of Defense acknowledged those problems as early as 1985 in a proposal 
request to solicit a new vaccine.11 The proposal emphasized the “requirement to develop 
a safe and effective product which will protect U.S. troops” from anthrax spores. 
Pentagon officials confirmed the military lacked a vaccine that safely and effectively 
protected military personnel against exposure to anthrax. U.S. Army scientists also 
acknowledged the product as an “experimental limited-use vaccine.”12 Two 
congressional reports corroborated these findings. One report established that prior to 
the first Gulf War the anthrax vaccine “was rarely used,” considered “investigational,” 
and deemed it as “a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf military 
personnel.”13 The other report determined the current anthrax vaccine was 
“experimental.”14 
Safety and Efficacy Issues 
Additional oversight reports cited Pentagon studies acknowledging that up to 35 percent 
of soldiers had adverse reactions to the anthrax vaccine, and that 6 percent of recipients 
reported serious complications after vaccination.15 The military studies caused 
authorities to alter previously low adverse reaction rates, changing warnings listed on 
the approved labeling.16 Despite the changes, the military continued to insist on the 
safety of the vaccine, while the Government Accountability Office disclosed that “a 
significantly large number of vaccine recipients reported experiencing adverse events.”17 
Government oversight reports confirmed the long-term safety of the vaccine had not 
been assessed, while raising questions about ingredient alterations and problems with 
human efficacy testing of the vaccine.18  
Recent Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War 
Veterans’ Illnesses Scientific Findings and Recommendations validated concerns that 
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“studies have indicated that the current anthrax vaccine is associated with high rates of 
acute adverse reactions.”19 Though the report ostensibly dismissed the anthrax vaccine 
as a possible cause of veteran illnesses, the study acknowledged the need for further 
research to “analyze associations between Gulf War illness and individual vaccines, 
combinations of vaccines” and to evaluate “diagnosed diseases in personnel known to 
have received the anthrax vaccine.”20 An earlier Institute of Medicine report 
corroborated the need for more data stating, “There is a paucity of published peer-
reviewed literature on the safety of the anthrax vaccine.”21 A later report included 
additional findings that the “current anthrax vaccine is difficult to standardize, is 
incompletely characterized, and is relatively reactogenic [reactive].” The institute 
acknowledged the “long and challenging” dose regimen and determined a “new vaccine, 
developed according to more modern principles of vaccinology, is urgently needed.”22 
Accordingly, the government recently moved to reduce the vaccine’s cumbersome 
eighteen-month, six-dose regimen to five shots, and altered the route of administration 
in order to decrease “adverse events.” While the continued lengthy protocol seems 
incompatible with emergency response, the efficacy of the reduced dosage remains 
unproven due to pending submissions of immunogenicity response data. As a result, 
health officials continue to confirm “routine immunization is not recommended.”23 The 
conclusions comport with pre-2001 cautions from a former commander of the U.S. 
Army Medical Research and Development Command at Fort Detrick concerning 
multiple doses and purification issues, which “argue strongly against procuring large 
amounts for civilian use.”24 
Regulatory issues 
Regulatory lapses also marked troubles with past use of the vaccine, leading to a Food 
and Drug Administration notice of intent to revoke the anthrax vaccine manufacturer’s 
license based on quality control deviations.25 The Government Accountability Office, in 
a report titled “Anthrax Vaccine Changes to the Manufacturing Process,” also revealed 
pre-2001 unreported production alterations that violated Food and Drug 
Administration rules.26 The report revealed that the vaccine maker failed to notify the 
government about alterations to the manufacturing process in the early 1990s, and 
reported the manufacturer did not perform the requisite studies to confirm vaccine 
quality remained unaffected. The Government Accountability Office also discovered 
potential potency problems resulting from the unreported alterations, and documented 
violations of regulations in their inspection report. The analysts noted government rules 
where “any changes to the manufacturing that have the potential to affect the safety, 
purity, or potency of a biologic must be submitted and approved … prior to 
implementation.” Despite this requirement, requests for approval of the alterations did 
not occur for up to ten years after implementation.27 The problematic potency issues, 
and a myriad of quality control problems, ultimately resulted in government regulators 
deeming that the “manufacturing process for Anthrax Vaccine is not validated” as early 
as 1998.28 Notwithstanding past problems, the government expedited manufacturing 
process validation for the vaccine immediately following the anthrax letter attacks in 
October 2001.29 
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The problems with vaccine potency testing appeared to weigh heavily on the mind of 
the U.S Army scientist suspected of mailing the 2001 anthrax letters that killed five 
Americans. Emails released by federal investigators revealed the scientist’s contention 
that the vaccine “isn’t passing the potency test,” as well as the implications of these 
failures. The scientist’s email stated, “If it doesn’t pass … the program will come to a 
halt.” The government’s analysis of the anthrax letter attack crimes documented that the 
implicated U.S. Army scientist held direct responsibility for the problematic potency 
testing as a member of the army’s anthrax potency testing team.  
Additional emails quoted the scientist’s concerns that “apparently Gore (and maybe 
even Bush) is considering making the anthrax vaccine for the military voluntary, or even 
stopping the program.” In addition to alleging the vaccine’s problems served as the 2001 
anthrax letter-attack motive, the Federal Bureau of Investigation documented the 
coincidence of anthrax vaccine program resumption following the crimes, and the army 
scientist’s award of the highest military honors for “getting the anthrax vaccine back into 
production.”30 The U.S. Army’s Medical Research and Material Command also 
acknowledged the army scientist helped to get the “the anthrax vaccine back into 
production…working directly with the manufacturer…to determine where the problems 
were and resolve them so the vaccine would pass the potency test.”31 The scientist 
himself acknowledged, “Awards are nice. But the real satisfaction is knowing the vaccine 
is back on-line.”32  
Despite the known and potentially unresolved pre-2001 problems, the letter attacks 
succeeded in reversing the suspected cancellation of the Defense Department’s 
mandatory program and directly resulted in significantly expanded procurement of the 
old anthrax vaccine for America’s emergency stockpile in the years that followed. 
Legal Issues 
The anthrax vaccine also suffers from a troubled legal history. Federal courts affirmed 
the vaccine “was an investigational drug being used for an unapproved purpose.”33 
Other federal courts reaffirmed this ruling, declaring the Pentagon’s program as a 
“violation of federal law” prior to a belated, court ordered licensure of the vaccine.34 The 
vaccine received a final Food and Drug Administration license twenty years after a 1985 
proposed rule, fifty years after the vaccine’s advent.35 The licensing occurred after the 
courts ruled the mandatory military program illegal and “investigational” absent the 
requisite finalized license in accordance with governmental rule-making procedures.36  
Despite the critical judicial reviews, the government allocated over $1.2 billion for 
the anthrax vaccine, adding to a long history of earlier extraordinary financial relief for 
the embattled manufacturer.37 The latest appropriations occurred immediately after the 
2008 Federal Bureau of Investigation findings, adding to more than $50 billion 
allocated to bolster biological defenses in reaction to the letter attacks.38 Complicating 
the controversy, the Food and Drug Administration acknowledged the Department of 
Defense served as de facto manufacturer of the vaccine due to its “continuous 
involvement with, and intimate knowledge of, the formulation and manufacturing 
processes of all of these versions of the anthrax vaccine.”39 Military involvement in 
manufacturing and altering of a vaccine, long sold to the troops and the American 
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people as fully approved despite the lack of required prior approvals for alterations, 
presents distinct legal liabilities worthy of additional examination. 
THREAT ASSESSMENTS  
Official threat assessments also raise questions about the need for the old anthrax 
vaccine in national stockpiles. The Government Accountability Office reported that the 
Defense Department determined “the nature and magnitude of the anthrax threat has 
been stable since 1990.”40 A United Nations report substantiated past conventional 
wisdom about the potential threat of weaponized anthrax prior to the first Gulf War, but 
confirmed that the Iraqi program suffered technological hurdles in fielding dry 
weaponized anthrax.41 Government Accountability Office reports also noted that 
terrorists would find it difficult to overcome the technological and operational 
challenges on the road to employing a biological warfare agent.42 Nevertheless, in 
congressional testimony Pentagon leaders previously insisted that they possessed 
“absolutely unequivocal evidence” that Iraq had weaponized anthrax prior to the first 
Gulf War. Though subsequent threat assessments turned out to be “dead wrong,”43 the 
leaders added to the vaccine imperative by insisting, “An anthrax attack is fatal if you 
are not inoculated.”44  
Even after the 2001 letter attacks by the Army scientist demonstrated that antibiotics 
successfully countered lethal exposures to highly virulent spores, military leaders 
continued to maintain the anthrax attacks in October 2001 justified use of the vaccine.45 
These assertions defy medical evidence and expert recommendations. According to the 
Monterey WMD Terrorism Database, twelve anthrax “incidents” and 472 “hoaxes” 
occurred in the United States since 1992.46 For all actual infections diagnosed promptly, 
antibiotics successfully mitigated the resulting illnesses. As a result, government experts 
recommend antibiotics to combat the most lethal inhalation form of the disease. 
Ultimately, both the hyperbole of the threat and pronouncements of certain death 
absent anthrax inoculation proved to be categorically false. Regardless, the vaccine 
remains unapproved in “a post-exposure setting” and “not recommended for routine 
pre-event anthrax vaccination.”47 As well, the Centers for Disease Control Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations maintain that “Occupational 
groups engaged in response activities are not routinely recommended to receive anthrax 
vaccine due to lack of a calculable risk assessment.”48 
Threat assessments beyond the military require review as well. Shortly after the 
anthrax letter attacks the Department of Homeland Security National Strategy for 
Homeland Security emphasized the threat,49 as did the president’s State of the Union 
Address.50 Later, references to anthrax vaccine waned entirely from the most recent 
Homeland Security Strategy.51 As well, the homeland security secretary conceded “there 
is not currently a domestic emergency involving anthrax.” The secretary confirmed 
“There is not currently a heightened risk of an anthrax attack” and no credible 
information was present to indicate an imminent threat of an attack involving bacillus 
anthracis.52 Despite this statement, the Department of Health and Human Services 
declared an “anthrax emergency” through 2015 based on the “significant potential for a 
domestic emergency.”53 The emergency declaration purpose was intended to provide 
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product liability protection to manufacturers of stockpile countermeasures, including 
anthrax vaccine.  
Further academic and independent analysis also refutes the severity of the anthrax 
threat. One example points to the Aum Shinrikyo group’s unsuccessful attempts to 
produce and disperse anthrax. They also cited al Qaeda’s unsuccessful effort to obtain 
anthrax and to create a microbiological research facility. They noted that the 2001 
anthrax letter attacks remained the only successful “distribution of a high-quality dry-
powder preparation,”54 while the Federal Bureau of Investigation later determined that 
this attack originated from inside the U.S. biodefense community. A more measured, 
non-reactive approach also emerged from the National Academy of Sciences. Their 
report cautioned that society is too complex and interconnected to defend against every 
threat. The academy addressed the letter-attack threat as well stating “Reactions to 
anthrax episodes were strongly conditioned – and exaggerated.”55 Additional evidence 
of a growing scientific movement away from the old anthrax vaccine includes a recent 
report by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism. That report recommended use of “oral antibiotics” for the 
anthrax threat in lieu of vaccine. The congressionally sponsored report also advocated 
development of new classes of antibiotics against genetically modified anthrax. The 
commission called upon the next president to “enhance the nation’s capabilities for 
rapid response to prevent biological attacks,” but omitted any reference or 
recommendations to use the old anthrax vaccine.56  
CONCLUSION 
This less-than-reassuring review of the military experience with the old anthrax vaccine 
represents an opportunity for a thorough review by the new leadership of the 
Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services. Questions about 
the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine have been a constant theme since its 
inception, while manufacturing irregularities and legal problems nearly ended the 
program. The fact that the 2001 anthrax letter attacks were undertaken by the scientist 
in charge of vaccine potency testing for a program on the verge of failure, and that the 
attacks served to reinvigorate a troubled program in response to a “manufactured” 
crisis, creates fundamental doubts about expanding use of the vaccine. 
In light of uncertain threat assessments, relying on the letter attacks as 
rationalization for continued use of a product with well-known problems fails the litmus 
test of good government and sound public health policy. Those attacks, and Defense 
Department “continuous involvement” with the anthrax vaccine, effectively adulterated 
normal procurement processes involving the old anthrax vaccine, perpetuating the 
troubled program beyond a normal shelf life. Documented violations of the law indelibly 
stain the program from a historic perspective; while safety, efficacy, and necessity 
questions provide pragmatic justification for pursuing alternative protections. Sound 
alternatives include procurement of proven antibiotics and the development of next-
generation technologies to address legitimate threats. 
Fortunately, current top health officials recognize the salient need for “new vaccines, 
especially against anthrax,” and the “need to ensure that research institutions and 
REMPFER, ANTHRAX VACCINE 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 2 (MAY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
7 
individual researchers keep track of the whereabouts of dangerous pathogens, handle 
them safely, and store them securely.”57 Since federal investigators report “no other 
anthrax attacks” have occurred since the 2001 crimes, the time is right to realign current 
and future appropriations in the direction of modern, proven, and recommended 
countermeasures versus the old anthrax vaccine. At a minimum, a thorough review of 
the government’s use of the anthrax vaccine is in order to protect taxpayer resources in a 
fiscally constrained environment. 
Accordingly, President Barack Obama’s appointees in the Departments of Homeland 
Security and Health and Human Services should commence a comprehensive review of 
expanded use of the vaccine early in the new administration to protect the government 
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